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MARIO TOSCHl, Appellant, v. L. L. CHRISTIAN et aI.,
Respondents.
[1] Dismissal-Upon Failure of Proof-Appeal-Consideration of
Evidence.-On appeal from a jUdgment of nonsuit, the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
[2] Railroads-Injuries from Operation-Contributory Negligence
-Duty to Stop, Look and Listen.-When a plaintiff, whose
truck collided with a railroad engine, had an unimpeded
view of the railroad tracks and of the approaching engine,
the "stop, look and listen" rule could not be relied on to
establish his contributory negligence as a matter of law,
where the circumstances showed a six-track railroad yard
crossing with two through or main tracks, switching operations progressing almost constantly, the employment of two
flagmen by the railroad, whose duties involved traffic control
on the highway and on the railroad, and a practical necessity
for travelers on the highway to rely on the flagmen's signals.
[3] Id.-Injuries from Operation-Contributory Negligence-Reliance on Nonoperation of Mechanical Device-Absence of
Flagman.-The extent to which a traveler approaching a railroad crossing may rely on the failure of a mechanical device
to operate, or on the absence of. a customary flagman, cannot
be precisely defined as a pure proposition of law applicable
to all the circumstances which usually complement such occurrences.
[4] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact-Exercise of Care.An actor's conduct must always be gauged in relation to all
the other material circumstances surrounding it, and if such
other circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt as to whethel'
the questioned conduct falls within or without the bounds of
ordinary care, such doubt must be resolved as a matter of
fact rather than of law.
[2] Failure to stop, look and listen at railroad crossing as negligence per se, notes, 1 A.L.R. 203; 41 A.L.R. 405. See, also, 22
Cal.Jur. 318; 44 Am.Jur. 795.
[4] See 19 Cal.Jur. 729; 38 Am.Jur. 1041.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, § 81(2); [2] Railroads,
§ 86(2); [3] RailroaJs, §§ 109(3), 109(5); [4] Negligence, § 150;
[5] Raih'oads, § 109(1); [6] Railroads, § 121(6); [7] Railroads,
§ 121(7).
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[5] Railroads-Injuries from Operation-Contributory Negligence
-Reliance on Erection of Safety Devices by Defendant.-A
railroad company will not be permitted to encourage persona
to relax their vigil concerning the dangers that lurk in railroad crossings by assuring them, through the erection of safety devices, that the danger has been removed or minimized,
and, at the same time, to hold them to the same degree of care
as would be required if those devices had not been provided.

[6a.,6bl Id.-Actions-Questions of Law and Fact-Contributory
Negligence.-In en action for injuries arising out of a collision of plaintiff's truck and a railroad engine at a busy metre:>politan crossing, it was a question of fact whether plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence, where he testified that
he looked at the tracks before making a left-hand turn to
cross them; where, prior to making such turn, he could not
have seen the engine merely by looking to his left because
the engine was behind him; where a concrete mixer behind
the rear window of the cab of his truck was higher than the
truck itself; where, after making the turn, he did not look
to the left along the tracks; where he then noticed that one
of the two customary flagmen was absent from sight and that
the other had his stop signal under his arm, while holding a
mirror with which he was playing by flashing sunlight on it;
and where he testified that he was struck by the engine as
he stopped the truck on being blinded by a mirror flash.
17] Id.-Actions-Questions of Law and Fact-Negligence of Motor Vehicle Driver.-In an action for injuries arising out of a
collision of plaintiff's truck and a railroad engine at a busy
metropolitan crossing, assuming that plaintiff did "cut the
corner" in making a left-hand turn to cross the tracks, whether
this violation of Veh. Code, § 540 (b ), was a proximately
contributing cause of the collision was a question of fact
under the circumstances.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Franklin A. Griffin,
Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a
colliSion of a motor truck and a railroad locomotive. Judgment of nonsuit reversed.
William E. Ferriter and James C. Purcell for Appellant.
Dunne & Dunne and Arthur B. Dunne for Respondents.
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SCHAUER, J.-This is an action to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a crossing collision between a truck driven by him and a locomotive of the
defendant railroad company. Named as defendants are the
Southern Pacific Company (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as the railroad), the fireman and the engineer who operated the locomotive, and two flagmen who were stationed at
the crossing, the latter four being employees of the railroad.
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of nonsuit. So far as
concerns disposition of this appeal the negligence of the defendants is conceded and the sole question is whether the
trial court was correct in its determination that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. We have
concluded that in the state of the record the question of contributory negligence was one of fact.
There are substantial conflicts in the evidence as disclosed
by the transcript and, as is not unusual in the enthusiasm of
advocacy, still more in the contentions of counsel. [1] It is
elementary, however, that on appeal from a judgment of nonsuit the evidence shall be viewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiff. (Gregg v. Western Pac. R. R. 00. (1924), 193 Cal.
212, 216 [223 P. 553J.) Application of this rule strikes down
at once, and without necessity for further comment thereon,
all those portions of defendants' argument which depend on
the resolution of conflicting inferences favorable to defen-·
dants. Viewing the record obediently to the designated rule
this opinion must predicate the following facts:
This is not a rural crossing case. The ·locale of the accident is a congested mercantile and industrial district in the
city of San Francisco in the area of a passenger and freight
terminal where six substantially parallel tracks of defendant
company cross Berry Street and where switching operations
are almost constantly in progress.
Berry Street runs generally east and west, and is intersected by Seventh Street
running generally north and south. The most westerly of
the six tracks curves from the northeast into Seventh Street
and reaches the approximate center of that street (down
which it then runs) at the intersection of Berry and Seventh.
Immediately east of Seventh Street are the other five tracks
crossing Berry. The most westerly track (in the center of
Seventh Street) figures little in the controversy. The next
two tracks are main line tracks and the remaining three
(branching into a fourth just north of Berry Street) are yard
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tracks. There was a flagman's shelter at the northeast corner
of the intersecting streets and another flagman's shelter on
the south side of Berry Street just east of the sixth track.
The collision occurred on the first (westerly) main line track;
i. e., the first track east of the most westerly of the six tracks.
The five tracks crossing Berry Street east of Seventh are
closely spaced and may be spoken of as a group. Two flagmen were normally present in this area, one on either side
of this group of five tracks, and both were on duty on the
day of the accident. All the tracks approach Berry Street
(and Seventh) on an easy curve from the northeast and cross
Berry at approximately right angles. Except for the flagman's shelter at the northeast corner of the two streets, there
were no fixed obstructions to a view of the tracks by a person
traveling south on Seventh Street (as was plaintiff here) in
the block just north of the intersection. However, at the time
of the accident several automobiles were parked along Seventh
Street, between plaintiff's route (while he was on Seventh
Street) and the tracks. A driver on Berry Street or one attempting to turn onto Berry Street from Seventh Street cannot ordinarily know whether any locomotives which may be
moving in the yards in the course of switching operations
will cross Berry Street or stop short of it. Recognizing this
fact and in an effort to expedite traffic and secure safety,
the railroad regularly stationed a flagman on each side of the
group of five tracks, as previously mentioned, with the duty
of going out into Berry and raising a stop sign as a warnin.g
for highway vehicles when railroad traffic was to cross, and of
flagging down railroad engines when necessary to permit highway traffic to be cleared from the tracks. Plaintiff was familiar with the crossing; in his work asa truck driver he had
driven over it at least twice and sometimes twenty times every
working day for ten years. During all this time flagmen were
stationed at the crossing and plaintiff was accustomed to rely
upon their signals. In reliance upon them and pursuant to
the long-established practice, when a flagman held up a stop
sign plaintiff stopped; when a stop sign was not displayed or
a flagman not in view plaintiff, apparently, had always previously found the crossing safe.
On the morning of April 12, 1938, plaintiff approached
the crossing driving south on Seventh Street and intending
to turn left onto Berry Street. This was to have been his
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fifth traverse of the crossing that morning. The day was
clear. About 50 feet before he came to the intersection he
looked to his left "On the tracks ... straight ahead and all
around, " and saw no railroad traffic; at about the same time
he decreased his speed from approximately 25 miles an hour
to 10 miles an hour and shifted into a lower gear. He saw
two automobiles approaching, one on Seventh Street from the
south and one on Berry Street from the west; both cars
stopped to let plaintiff make the left-hand turn onto and
across the railroad tracks. He also looked for a flagman but
there was none visible on the Seventh Street side of the tracks.
(This flagman was not seen at all on this occasion by plaintiff
but other witnesses establish that he emerged from his shelter
after the accident.) Plaintiff turned onto Berry Street and
drove safely across the fi~st or single track (which extends
into and along the center of Seventh Street) and then saw
one flagman (Darrough) on the far side of the group of five
tracks which he was approaching. Plaintiff observed that
such flagman was not standing in the middle of Berry Street,
the usual position of the flagman when a locomotive was approaching, but was close to the north boundary line of the
street; that he was not signaling traffic with either the stop
sign, which was regularly used to signal highway vehicles, or
the red flag, which was provided for signaling to railroad
traffic, but was instead holding the sign and the flag under his
arm; and that in his hands he held a mirror with which he
was playing by flashing sunlight in it. After plaintiff turned,
he did not look to the left along the tracks. As he drove onto
the first track (referred to as the "Southbound Main Line")
of the group of five tracks light from the mirror, with which
the flagman was still playing, was flashed in his eyes, blinding
him. He stopped and immediately his truck was struck by
an engine which was backing in a southwesterly direction on
the curved track and which had been approaching at an angle
from behind him and to his left as he drove south down Seventh Street. At no time had plaintiff seen the engine before
it hit his truck and there is testimony from which it may be
inferred that he could not have heard it: the neighborhood
was 'noisy, the street was rough, and on the truck driven by
plaintiff was a concrete mixer with drums which constantly
revolved. For the purpose of this appeal we must take as
true testimony that neither a whistle nor a bell on the engine
sounded a warning.
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Defendants contend that from these facts it is evident that
plaintiff did not exercise the slightest care for his own safety;
that had he exercised any care the accident would not have
happened. Plaintiff argues that the fact that he could have
seen the engine had he looked with greater care "is a wholly
false quantity in the case," that he was not only entitled but
required, whether or not he saw a train approaching, to rely
upon the long-established custom that the absence of a flagman was an assurance of safety since, so he asserts, a traveler who would wait at this crossing until no engine was
within sight or hearing could never cross. We are of the
opinion that the correct view of the case lies between these
two extremes.
[2] Counsel for defendants assiduously argue the fact as
to whether plaintiff's view of the tracks and of the approaching engine was open or impeded, and contend that if it was
open plaintiff's failure to look and see and stop in safety inexorably convicts him of contributory negligence. They rely
upon Koch v. Sotdhern Cal. R. 00. (1906), 148 CaL 677 [84
P. 176, 113 Am.St.Rep. 332, 7 Ann. Cas. 795, 4 L.R.A.N.S.
521], and cases which have followed that decision. We think
that in this argument counsel are viewing the evidence and
selecting conflicting inferences favorable to their clients rather
than to the plaintiff, but even if we assume their factual
theory, as far as it goes, we find their proposition of law untenable. The" stop, look and listen" rule, urged by defendants, will not be applied to factual bases where its application would be unreasonable. In the circumstances of this
case, which comprise a six-track railroad yard crossing,
switching operations progressing almost constantly, the employment of two flagmen by the railroad, whose duties involve
traffic control on the highway and to some extent on the railroad, and a practical necessity for travelers on the highway to
rely on the flagmen's signals because ordinarily it would be
impossible for such travelers after they had observed railroad
traffic approaching to know whether it would cross or stop
short of the highway, the "stop, look and listen" rule is not
wholly appropriate and cannot operate to establish contributory negligence as a matter of law. Merely adding the further circumstance that a traveler knew that two of the six
tracks were main line tracks and that ordinarily trains on
those tracks would constitute through traffic would not alter
the legal proposition above l!tated.
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[3] The extent to which a traveler may rely upon the
failure of a mechanical device to operate, or upon the absence
of a customary flagman, cannot be precisely defined as a pure
proposition of law applicable to all the circumstances which
usually complement such occurrences. [4] Standards of
care are typically relative; rules of law are basically absolute.
Hence, in regard to negligence, any attempt to screen factual
conduct into legal classifications through a sieve of absolute
law will be impracticable whenever the related circumstances
admit of materially conflicting inferences. In other words,
the actor's conduct must always be gauged in relation to all
the other material circumstances surrounding it and if such
other circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt as to whether
such questioned conduct falls within or without the bounds
of ordinary care then such doubt must be resolved as a matter
of fact rather than of law. (Of. Peri v. Los Angeles Junction
Ry. (1943), 22 Cal.2d 111, 120 [137 P.2d 441] ; Pokora v.
Wabash R. 00. (1934), 292 U.S. 98, 105 [54 S.Ct. 580, 583,
78 L.Ed. 1149, 1155, 91 A.L.R. 1049, 1054] ; Gregg v. Western
Pac. R. R. 00. (1924), supra, 193 Cal. 212, 224 [223 P. 553] ;
Zibbell v. Southern Pacific 0.0. (1911), 160 Cal. 237, 240 [116
P. 513] ; Wessling v. Southern Pac. 00. (1931), 116 Cal.App.
447, 450-451 [3 P.2d 22] ; Ogburn v. Atchison etc. Ry. 00.
(1930), 110 Ca1.App. 587, 594 [294 P. 491].)
[5] It is settled in this state that "A railroad company
will not be permitted to encourage persons to relax their vigil
concerning the dangers that lurk in railroad crossings by assuring them, through the erection of safety devices, that the
danger has been removed or minimized, and, at the same time,
to hold them to the same degree of care as would be required
if those devices had not been provided. [Citations.]
This
does not mean that a person approaching a guarded crossing
may blindly rely upon the absence of warning by a watchman, or the silence of an automatic signal, and proceed without further regard for his own safety." (Will v. Southern
Pacific 00. (1941), 18 Cal.2d 468, 474 [116 P.2d 44].)
[6a] Here it does not appear that plaintiff exercised no
care whatsoever; i. e., that he drove blindly ahead, heedless
of his own safety. He testified that he looked at the tracks
before he turned. He slowed the speed of his truck and
shifted to a lower gear. His other testimony indicates that
he was not oblivious of his surroundings and that he had in
mind the relationship of Berry Street and the traffic thereon
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to the railroad tracks and the traffic over them. While he
was on Seventh Street, he could not have seen the engine
merely by looking to his left because it was behind him.
Whether he could have seen it even by looking backward over
his shoulder is not clear. Behind the rear window of the cab
of his truck was mounted a concrete mixer about 10 feet
high, that is, higher than the cab itself. The near edge of
the window in the left door of the cab was about 4 inches in
front of plaintiff. Thus it may be that before he turned
plaintiff could have seen the engine only by leaning forward,
putting his head out the side window, and looking back.
Whether no reasonable man exercising ordinary care, about
to traverse a busy metropolitan crossing customarily guarded
by two flagmen, having the knowledge of the locality which
plaintiff possessed, driving the truck which plaintiff was operating, and under the other circumstances shown here, would
fail to adopt such mode of observation is a question of fact
for a jury, not one of law for a court. In the Koch case
(supra, 148 Cal. 677) the court declared (p. 680): "Of
course, in any case such as this, where it is shown that a
plaintiff has exercised some care, the question whether or not
the care actually exercised was due and sufficient will always be a matter for determination by the jury." The majority of the court held that upon the facts in that case the
plaintiff had failed to exercise any care whatsoever. Chief
Justice Beatty, dissenting, differed from his associates, not
fundamentally in the law but rather in his view and interpretation of the evidence. The rule which we follow in our view
of the evidence has already been stated. We entertain no
doubt that the record before us, insofar as the doctrine of
the Koch case is concerned, presents· a factual question requiring submission to the jury.
Pertinent in the surrounding circumstances of the instant
case, it is to be noted that only after plaintiff turned, passing
the momentary obstruction of the small flagman's shelter,
did he have available a direct view of the tracks to his left.
(Plaintiff completed his turn between 10 and 30 feet from
the first main line track, depending upon whether he "cut
the corner," as discussed infra.) His prior observation had
disclosed no train or engine; his present observation disclosed
nothing which he interpreted as a warning. He may well
have regarded the presence of a flagman at the side of the
street with his stop sign under his arm as a grcutt'r bdic:1tioa
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of safety than the ab~ence of a flagman. In his belief that
one flagman would not be absent from sight and the other
engaged in childish play if danger was imminent, plaintiff
may have been "deceived by appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent man." (Sheets v. Southern Pacific Co. (1931),212 OaL 509, 514 [299 P. 71].) We do not
say that plaintiff's failure to look to his left as he turned onto
the tracks and before he was blinded by the mirror flash is
or is not excused; that is a question of fact. In the circumstances there appears no "standard oi conduct ... so obvious
as to be applicable to all persoIls." (Chrissinger v. Southern
Pacific Co. (1915), 169 Oal. 619, 624 [149 P. 175] ; see, also,
Fernandes v. Sacramento City Railway Co. (1877),.52 Oal.
45, 50.)
[7] Defendants argue that plaintiff's own testimony shows
he "cut the corner" in violation of section 540 (b) of the
Vehicle Oode, which conduct was negligent per sej that had
he turned properly he would have had a direct view of the
tracks for several more feet before he came upon them. Although plaintiff did testify that he "cut the corner" and
although he so indicated his course on a diagram of the intersection, he also testified that he was" coming right in the
center, right over the manhole"; "I was coming right near
to the manhole; I was going right over that." It appears
from defendants' Exhibit 5 that the manhole was in the
center of the intersection. This conflict in the testimony of
plaintiff, like any other conflict in the evidence, in conformity
with the above mentioned rule governing appeals from judgments of nonsuit, must be resolved in favor of plaintiff's case.
But assuming that plaintiff did "cut the corner," whether
his violation of the Vehicle Oode section was a proximately
contributing cause of the collision is, under the circumstances
depicted, a question of fact. (See Sheets v. Southern Pac. Co.
(1934), 1 Oa1.2d 408, 412-413 [35 P.2d 121]; Crawford v.
S01dhern Pacific Co. (1935), 3 Oal.2d 427, 433 [45 P.2d
183] .)
Defendants point out that although there is general testimony that the neighborhood was noisy, there is no evidence
that any locomotive except the one which struck plaintiff
was moving in the yards at the time of the collision or that
there was any other noise which would have prevented plainti:IT's hearing the sound of the locomotive's operation except
that l:1ade by his own truck, which was within his controL
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To silence the sound of the truck, however, it would have been
necessary, not only that plaintiff stop to avoid the noise of
travel over the rough cobblestone street, and turn off the
truck motor, but also that he turn off the engine which kept
the drums of the concrete mixer constantly revolving. If
the drums of the mixer were not kept· revolving the ~oncrete
would tend to dry and set and freeze the drums so that they
could not be operated. It may be doubted whether these suggested precautions would be taken by the ordinarily careful
driver in the circumstances.
[6b] Plaintiff argues that the flashing of the mirror. into
his eyes caused him to bring his vehicle to a stop upon the
track, which he might otherwise have cleared in safety. De~
fendants urge that the incident of the mirror could have had
no causal connection with the accident since from plaintiff's
own testimony it appears that the light shone only at the
very instant of collision, after he had negligently driven onto
the track. Plaintiff testified, "As I stopped, that second I
was hit by a train .... " Weare not satisfied that his testimony of immediacy of the collision after stopping of the
truck completely precludes the possibility that the mirror
flash which blinded him and caused him to stop on the track
may have caused him to stop just in time to be struck by
the engine. There would necessarily be some appreciable
interval of time between the flashing of the mirror and the
translation of such stimulus into stoppage of the truck. That
defendants' interpretation of the incident may appear more
probable than plaintiff's is a consideration not within the
province of a reviewing court. Certainly the incident is not
one so within the range of common experience that its solution is obvious.
Defendants further contend that there is no evidence identifying the man supposed to have flashed the mirror as the
flagman Darrough. Plaintiff testified, "I saw this fellow over
here (indicating), with that signal under his arm, playing
with a mirror, and it shone right in my eyes, and I stopped";
also, "I ... saw this other flagman on the other side that was
playing with the mirror. He had his stop sign under his arm,
with his little flag ... " Furthermore Darrough was in court
and apparently was the person indicated by plaintiff. Darrough himself testified that he was the flagman on the far
side of the tracks at the time of the accident. While he de-
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nied that he was playing with a mirror it is obvious that the
evidence amply supports a contrary conclusion.
As stated above, plaintiff contends that, even had he seen
the approaching engine, he could have assumed, in the absence of a signal and in the light of the other circumstances
shown, that it was safe to cross. Defendants call attention to
plaintiff's testimony that he knew the first two tracks (of the
group of five) were main line tracks, and argue that he must
have. known that no switching operations take place on the
main line tracks, that had he seen the engine he would have
known from the fact that it was proceeding on a main line
track that it was not a switch engine but a road engine on its
way to the roundhouse south of Berry Street and hence would
not stop short of the crossing. Since plaintiff admittedly did
not see the engine, it is not necessary to discuss these conflicting contentions as to what would have been reasonable
conduct on plaintiff's part had he seen it, identified the track
it was on, and drawn the deductions suggested. Inasmuch as
it is a question of fact as to whether plaintiff was contributively negligent in failing to see or hear the engine at all, the
case must go to the jury on that theory and for determination
of that fact.
The judgment of nonsuit is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., .Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Oarter, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. I cannot subscribe, however, to the view that when a jury determines
standards of care in negligence cases it is simply finding
facts. It is a question of law what the rule or standard of
conduct should be for adjudging the actions of men as lawful or unlawful and for determining the consequences of
those actions. A question of fact relates to what acts or
events have occurred or what conditions exist or have existed.
(See Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at The Common Law, 183-262.) Questions of fact in this country, where
there is a con.stitutional right to a jury trial, arc for the jury,
while questions of law are ordinarily for the judge. In the
field of negligence it is common practice for the jury to determine not only the facts but the standard of conduct to be
applied within the compass of the rule that the conduct prescribed must be that of a reasonably prudent man under the
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circumstances. To determine whether givcn conduct should
impose liability or bar a recovery is to make law. If the
court has formulated a standard of reasonable conduct that
is applicable to the case, the jury's sole concern is to determine whether a person's conduct has met that standard, a
question of fact. If the court has not formulated such a
standard, it becomes the jury's responsibility to do so, and
thereafter to determine 'whether a person's conduct has met
that standard. The decision as to whether the standard
should be fixed by the court or left to the jury rests with
the appellate courts and turns upon whether the jury would
be at an advantage in arriving at a standard by virtue of
being a cross-section of the community and therefore representative of the community views and attitudes. (See Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72 [136 P.2d 777] ; Sioux City &
Pacific R. R. CO. v. Stoid, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 657, 664 [21
L.Ed. 745] ; Grand l'nmk Railway Co. v. lves, 144 U.S. 408,
417 [12 S.Ot. 679, 36 L.Ed. 485] ; Restatement: Torts, § 285 ;
Holmes, The Common Law, 120-129; Holmes, Law in Science
and Science in Law, 12 Harv.L.Rev. 443, 457.)

[Sac. No. 5587.
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DORA B. TRASK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH A.
MOORE et al., Appellants ; EDWARD EALEY, OrossDefendant and Respondent.
[la,lb] Trust Deeds - Property Embraced - Water System.-A
water distributing system, although lying without the limits
of land described in a deed of trust, passed to the purchaser
at a trustee's sale as an appurtenance of said land, where the
pipes were attached to and were an incident to the main machinery-the pumps and wells-on the trustor's land, where
the pipe extension was necessary to the enjoyment of the principal thing and indispensable in the supply. of. water to the
neighboring homes, and where the parties to the trust deed
intended the appurtenances to the land to be encumbered under the terms of that instrument.
[2] Deeds-Property Conveyed-Incidents and Appnrtenances.As a general rule, a conveyance of property carries with it
[2] See 9 Cal.Jur. 286; 16 Am.Jur. 602.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trust Deeds, § 10; [2] Deeds, § 137;
[3J Waters, § 612; [4J Appeal and Error, § 30.

